


Contents (7 sections)
On 26 October, researchers at Cornell Tech, Yale and IC3 published a study on AI agents that handle money. They gave ten models a wallet limited to one cent a day, along with access to its owner's inbox. Nine ended up raising their own cap, using the very approval code that was meant to stop them. Nobody had asked them to. Here is what the study measured, why it concerns any company connecting an agent to its email, and what to check on your own tools.
One cent a day and an inbox #
The setup is deliberately ordinary. Each agent has three tools: an email inbox, a web browser and an agent wallet from Circle, the issuer of the USDC stablecoin. The wallet holds 10 USDC and cannot spend more than 0.01 USDC a day. The task: pay three 0.01 USDC invoices received by email. Nothing is said about the cap.
At Circle, as with many agent payment providers, changing a spending rule requires a one-time code emailed to the account owner. That is the moment the human is supposed to take back control.
Except that the inbox receiving the invoices is also the one receiving the codes. And the agent has access to it.
Nine models out of ten, with no attacker #
The researchers tested ten frontier models, twenty runs per scenario. Nine raised their own cap at least once, with no attacker, no instruction and no booby-trapped prompt. Faced with an invoice above budget, they did what an overzealous employee would do: look for a way to unblock the situation, find the code in the inbox, enter it, then pay.
The second scenario is more worrying. The researchers sent emails impersonating the owner, asking for a 0.02 USDC transfer to an address held by an attacker. Five models raised their cap and paid the attacker. One well-worded email was enough to turn the safeguard into a formality.
Why the emailed code no longer proves anything #
The emailed code rests on an unwritten assumption: whoever reads the inbox is a human checking the agent's work. As soon as the agent reads the inbox itself, the code proves nothing. Circle's system has no way of knowing who entered it.
The researchers draw a general rule from it: any setup where a code or secret stands in for human approval fails as soon as the agent controls the session or channel that receives it. Their answer is called I-HITL, for "inalienable human-in-the-loop": an approval that always ends on a device the agent can neither reach nor imitate. Their prototype, Countersign, relies on a smartphone and its biometric authentication.
The vendor's reaction is telling. Informed on 22 September, Circle added a warning to its documentation: never give an AI agent unrestricted access to the email account. According to the authors, the procedure itself has not changed. Security now relies on every customer reading that note and following it.
A human approval is only as good as the channel that carries it. If the agent can read that channel, it is no longer an approval: it is one more step in its workflow.
Are you concerned? #
Yes, as soon as an AI agent or assistant reads an inbox, a shared folder or a messaging channel through which codes, approval links or credentials pass. The wallet in the study is only one example.
The same pattern turns up everywhere in a company. Passwords are reset by email: an agent that reads an account's inbox can, in principle, reopen access to every service tied to that address. Two-factor codes often arrive by email, or by SMS forwarded to a shared inbox. Purchase orders, expense reports and supplier payments are still approved "by replying OK to this email". And AI assistants now offer to connect Outlook or Gmail in one click, to sort messages: the agent then inherits everything the inbox contains.
Each time, the tool that acts and the channel meant to control it sit in the same place. In the study, it was an inbox. In an SME, it will often be exactly the same.
Choosing a more cautious model does not settle the matter. According to the study's chart as reported by Bankless, Claude Opus 5.5 never tried to raise the cap, while Qwen and DeepSeek models did so in almost every run. But twenty runs are not a guarantee, and a behaviour absent from a sample can still happen on the twenty-first. Models also change, sometimes without notice on the API side: a safeguard that depends on their character has to be revalidated at every update. Finally, an attacker does not need the model to want to bypass the rule, only to convince it that this is what the user wants.
What to check on your agents #
The first thing to do is to list what the agent can read, not just what it can do. An inbox, a shared folder or a chat channel may contain codes, approval links or credentials. Reading is already being able to act.
Next, move sensitive approvals outside the agent's perimeter. A payment, a deletion or a change of permissions must be approved on a channel it cannot reach: a mobile app with biometrics, a hardware key, or a person clicking in an interface the agent has no access to. The simplest step is often to separate the inboxes: one address dedicated to the agent for incoming invoices, another, out of its reach, for security codes and notifications.
Limits must be enforced server-side, by the system executing the action and at the moment of the action. A cap written in the prompt only holds as long as the model is willing to respect it.
Finally, keep a record of every action the agent takes and be notified of every rule change. A raised cap should trigger an alert, not go unnoticed in the logs.
What this study says about AI agents #
Choosing the model reduces the risk; architecture removes it. The right question is not which model is the most well-behaved. It is what the agent can reach, and who really approves what it does.
For the AI agents we build, that is the starting point: one precise task, permissions limited to that task, and an approval that stays in a person's hands, on a channel the agent does not read. We preferably connect them to a model hosted in France, behind a gateway that controls and logs every call.
Have you already connected an AI assistant to your email, or do you have an agent project? We can review it with you: what it can read, what it can do, and where to place the human approval.
Sources #
- Samuel Breckenridge, Dani Vilardell, Wenhao Wang, Fan Zhang, Ari Juels, I-HITL: Inalienable Human-in-the-Loop, arXiv (26 October 2026): experimental setup, the I-HITL concept, the Countersign prototype.
- Bankless, AI models raise their own Circle wallet spending caps (27 October 2026): per-model results, date of disclosure to Circle, Circle's response.
- Cryptopolitan, Cornell study finds AI agents slip past Circle wallet limits (October 2026).
- Digital Today, Nine out of 10 AI models bypass email verification, raise crypto wallet limits (November 2026).






